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Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract:       
The authors find that as they seek to develop a social model both appropriate to 
their  needs  and  consistent  with  EU  standards,  Eastern  European  countries  must 
understand  that  a  single  European  Social  Model  does  not  exist.  Recently,  some 
Eastern European unionists have begun to support their demands with reference to 
the European Social Model, which they only comprehend, however, in terms of its 
most  inefficient  Continental  form.  Eastern European countries must engage in a 
deeper public discussion of the pros and cons of various diverse social models, while 
taking into account  the effects of different social models on the past and future 
competitiveness of the countries that have adopted them. Let those models compete 
to open opportunities based on forward-looking approach with full respect to the 
minimum harmonized standards (such as social safety net etc.) instead of fixing the 
past.  
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The dynamic changes in social and economic systems throughout Europe, the structural changes in 
income and wealth distribution, regional distribution of economic activities, represent both core drivers 
and impacts of macro-, mezzo- and micro-structural changes that are hardly separable in causal chain.  
Their relevance goes, however, well beyond growth or economic world but spills over to political 
stability of the afflicted countries, of the EU and its position worldwide. What in 20
th century has 
distinguished  European  countries  from  the  rest  of  the  world  and  internally  and  are  those  features 
sustainable? 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL (AND ECONOMIC) MODEL  
As many authors have noted, in the first half of the last century, a perception of Europe as an inherently 
peaceful place striving towards a vision of social harmony would have seemed truly absurd (Wickham, 
2002). At that time, much of the world was still dominated by European nations whose administrative 
power was ensured by their military dominance. Unsurprisingly, after the devastation caused by two 
world wars that erupted from conflicts within Europe, the desire for peace, tranquillity, freedom and 
prosperity emerged as one of the most powerful European ideals. At the end of World War II, millions 
of refugees were homeless, the European economy had collapsed, and 70% of the European industrial 
infrastructure was destroyed. 
While some authors are trying to trace deeper historical roots
1, we join an often shared pragmatic view 
of the European Social Model as a product of the political settlement established at the end of the 
Second World War. Across all of Europe, a political consensus emerged among the forces that had 
opposed fascism, or at least those forces that no longer wanted to be identified with it, including both 
the political left (the trade unions, the social democrats, the communists) and the Christian Democrats 
(Wickham, 2002). Reforms in post-war Europe were concentrated on avoiding the social conflicts that 
characterized  the  time  period  during  and  between  the  wars,  and  therefore  both  polar  extremes, 
totalitarian and pure capitalist theories of governance, were criticised and reprobated.  Moreover, in 
order  to  prevent  Europe  from  tensions  possibly  ending  in  further  conflict,  there  was  a  movement 
towards  the  integration  and  interconnection  of  Europe  through  the creation of a type of European 
federation united by common interests, which was supported from many sides.   
                                                            
1 Unfortunately the long-term development and implementation of contrasting models and sub-models of capitalism and 
socialism representing different approaches to notions such as equality and justice or value based thinking goes well beyond 
the scope of this article. „At least since the French revolution equality has served as one of the leading ideals of the body 
politic; in this respect, it is at present probably the most controversial of the great social ideals... In its prescriptive usage, 
‘equality’ is a loaded and ‘highly contested’ concept.” – see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007, Giddens 2006,  etc.  2 
 
Since the European Community arose from the European Economic Community, its early aims and 
goals  were  strictly  economic  (that  included  the  introduction  of  “welfare  state”),  and purely social 
dimensions remained outside of its scope, leaving national member states utterly responsible for the 
social policies that determined the nature of their respective welfare states.  
All  EU  member  states  were  expected  to  maintain  a  balance  between  economic  growth  and  social 
development. According to the Treaty of Rome of 1957, member states were required to support the 
balanced development of economic activities while simultaneously working towards a high rate of 
employment, the provision of social security, an increase in the standard of living and quality of life, 
economic and social cohesion, and solidarity between member states. However, for quite a long time 
the emphasis on the development of “welfare state” solving current issues outweighed the emphasis on 
certain social matters, despite the member states’ adoption of new documents promoting social issues.  
A 1961 European Council document, entitled The European Social Charter, formed the foundation of 
the European Social Model. It established the main principles of the model: the provision of health 
insurance, social security, the protection of rights of the family and its status as a fundamental unit of 
society, improvement in working conditions and the right to education. Following the enlargement of 
the  Community  to  include  Ireland,  the  UK  and  Denmark,  the  Social  Action  Programme  of  1974 
instigated  another  wave  of  activity,  particularly  in  instituting  three  directives  outlawing  gender 
discrimination in pay, employment and social insurance. 
The term “social cohesion” is said to have been first used in the Single European Act (1987). In a 
socially  cohesive  society,  people  share  a  commitment  to  maintain  social  order  and  assume 
responsibility for the general social welfare in such a manner that their concern for society transcends 
immediate personal relationships. Cohesion is therefore somewhat the opposite of individualism.                                            
For much of the 1980s, subsequent attempts by the Commission to develop a more active social policy 
were  limited,  not  least  by  the  return  of  the  UK  to  an  Anglo-Saxon  social  model  and  the  UK 
government’s  determination  to  veto  anything  that  undermined  the  deregulation  of  the  UK  labour 
market. In the late 1980s, European integration was revitalized by the drive to create a single European 
market  in  1992.  As  a  reaction  to  this  process,  which  exposed  member  states  to  competition  on a 
European level, the Social Charter was adopted in 1989 “to protect member states from the excesses of 
the market” (Wickham, 2002).  The discussion on “the new welfare state” has been triggered
2. 
The term European Social Model is said to have emerged at the beginning of 1990s during the initial 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. The term was first used in a Green Paper issued in 1993 and 
later in a White Paper issued in 1994 on the future of social policy, which outlined a rather normative 
set of common values: personal freedom, social dialogue, equal opportunity and solidarity among all 
levels of society. The essential characteristics of this social model have not yet been clearly defined, 
and the various sources related to this topic only provide a general description of the model. In the 
words of Jepsen and Serrano Pascual (2005): “One of the fastest growing European catchwords at the 
present time - the “European Social Model” (ESM) - is used to describe the European experience of 
simultaneously promoting sustainable economic growth and social cohesion. …..  A clear definition of 
what constitutes its essence seems to be lacking in most documents on the subject, while a review of 
some of the most important of these documents reveals that, insofar as definitions are to be found, they 
do not necessarily converge.”
3 Diamantopoulou offers a different, more extreme interpretation of the 
                                                            
2 The new welfare state should adequatelly solve the current problems not the issues of the past. See Esping-Andersen (2002) 
3 In their article, Jepsen and Pascual aim to analyse and deconstruct the social model in order to identify its underlying 
ideological foundations and its various dimensions. They classify and discuss the ways in which the model is most frequently 
construed and propose a new approach to understanding this polysemy, arguing that the different dimensions of the concept 3 
 
model (2003): “The European social model: many claim that it is not really a model, it is not only 
social, and it is not particularly European.” 
As the European Parliament stated in its Report on a European Social Model intended to apply from 
July 2006: “The European social model is first and foremost a question of values. Whatever European 
social system we examine we find the common values of equality, non discrimination and solidarity and 
redistribution as fundamentals.“ 
After the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, European Union policy focused on the issue of 
single currency and the consolidation of the single market, leaving most of the decisions regarding the 
social  and  economic  rights  of  EU  citizens  at  the  level of  individual  member states.  Although EU 
documents did mention high level of employment and social protection as important aims, there were 
no  associated  criteria  for  their  enforcement,  contrary  to  the  extensive  treatment  of  the  acquis 
communautaire with regards to economic issues (de la Porte and Deacon, 2002). Within the EU-25, 
health, transportation, pensions, education and other public services were almost entirely left to the 
decisions of national governments. Since the financing and regulation of the various social models are 
determined at the national level, regulation, taxation and redistribution levels vary widely across the 
Union. For details on differences in redistribution levels see Table 1. Canoy,Smith (2006) provide 
further comprehensive comparison of highly diversified national social protection expenditures both in 
its share of GDP and in different methods of financing and methods of delivery. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
can be seen as rhetorical resources intended to legitimize the politically constructed and identity-built project of the EU 
institutions. 4 
 












        
   1995 2001 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003 2004 2004
EU25  40.5 40.8 40.3 33.8 34.8 31.5 32.7 41.7 27.4
EU15  40.5 41.1 40.6 33.6 34.6 31.6 33.1 46.2 31.4
BE  45.1 46.2 45.7 29.5 30.1 37.9 38.3 50.0 34.0
CZ  36.2 34.5 36.2 33.9 31.4 26.5 27.1 32.0 28.0
DK  49.0 49.8 48.8 35.0 35.7 62.4 61.1 47.6 30.0
DE  40.8 40.7 40.3 30.1 30.7 27.5 26.7 45.0 38.3
EE  37.9 31.6 33.4 36.6 39.4 28.9 26.2 26.0 26.0
EL  32.6 37.0 36.2 44.1 39.8 23.8 24.8 40.0 35.0
ES  33.4 34.8 35.6 32.7 35.1 31.4 30.9 45.0 35.0
FR  43.7 44.7 43.8 37.1 35.5 20.7 26.8 49.6 35.4
IE  33.5 30.2 29.9 43.9 43.5 41.1 41.2 42.0 12.5
IT  41.2 42.5 42.9 30.9 34.5 37.4 35.6 45.0 37.3
CY  26.9 31.5 33.3 42.7 49.6 32.9 29.2 30.0 15.0
LV  33.6 29.0 28.9 40.7 39.7 23.2 29.3 25.0 15.0
LT  28.6 28.8 28.5 43.0 41.6 30.6 28.4 33.0 15.0
LU  42.3 40.7 41.3 31.9 33.8 41.6 38.6 38.0 30.4
HU  41.6 39.3 39.1 42.8 42.4 21.3 25.0 40.0 17.7
MT  26.9 31.1 33.6 46.0 42.6 31.4 37.1 35.0 35.0
NL  40.6 40.0 39.3 29.3 33.9 31.2 29.3 52.0 34.5
AT  41.3 44.7 43.0 35.8 35.1 28.3 31.1 50.0 34.0
PL  39.4 35.4 35.8 40.1 42.8 32.4 20.1 40.0 19.0
PT  33.6 35.7 37.0 43.5 43.0 26.6 25.3 40.0 27.5
SI  40.8 39.1 40.1 39.5 41.8 17.7 21.1 50.0 25.0
SK  40.5 32.0 30.6 38.6 37.6 28.6 23.6 38.0 19.0
FI  46.0 46.0 44.8 31.0 32.3 38.2 41.0 53.0 29.0
SE  49.5 51.8 50.8 32.8 34.5 40.8 37.4 56.0 28.0
UK  35.4 37.3 35.7 39.9 38.3 42.7 43.7 40.0 30.0
as % of GDP  as % of total tax burden 
Total taxes  Direct taxes  Indirect taxes 
 
Source: Eurostat 
1) The top statutory personal income tax rate reflects the tax rate for the highest income bracket without surcharges.  The 
municipal income tax is included for Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. 
2) The effective top statutory tax rate on corporate income reflects the non-targeted rate including surcharges and averages 
of local taxes. For Estonia the rate refers only to distributed profits, as from 2000 the tax rate on retained earnings is zero. 
The rate for Italy includes ‘IRAP’ (rate 4.25%), a local tax levied on a tax base broader than corporate income. 




CURRENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL 
The question thus remains as to what extent it is advisable to harmonize EU policies. In this respect, it 
is  important  to  realize  that  the  prevailing  forms  of  the  European  social  model  only  exist  because 
Europeans accept the importance of the welfare state and value many of the public goods (provided 
originally by  the  state, now more by the private  sector  under regulation),  both of  which has  been 
necessarily accompanied by the existence of a certain public sphere and a relatively high redistribution 
level.
4  The  new  welfare  state  of  Esping-Andersen(2002)  should  adequately  address  new  risks  and 
issues.  
Scharpf  (2002)  argues  that  European  integration  has  created  a  constitutional  asymmetry  between 
policies promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and equality. “National 
welfare states are legally and economically constrained by European rules of economic integration, 
liberalization, and competition law, whereas efforts to adopt European social policies are politically 
impeded by the diversity of national welfare states, differing not only in levels of economic development 
and hence in their ability to pay for social transfers and services but, even more significantly, in their 
normative aspirations and institutional structures.” 
As a response to this fragmentation, the so-called “Open Method of Coordination” has emerged and is 
now being applied in the field of social policy. It leaves effective policy choices at the national level, 
but  attempts  to  improve  these  policy  choices  through  the  promotion  of  common  objectives  and 
common indicators, as well as comparative evaluations of national policy performance. According to 
Scharpf,  these  efforts  are  useful,  but  cannot  overcome  constitutional  asymmetry.  “Hence  there  is 
reason to search for solutions which must have the character of European law in order to establish 
constitutional  parity  with  the  rules  of  European  economic  integration,  but  which  also  must  be 
sufficiently differentiated to accommodate the existing diversity of national welfare regimes.” Scharpf 
presents two possible solutions: “Closer Cooperation” and a combination of differentiated “framework 
directives” through the Open Method of Coordination. 
                                                            
4 Wickham (2002) provides an example of some media being considered too important to be run purely for profit, since 
citizens have a right to good quality entertainment and impartial news which the market cannot be trusted to deliver. He 
believes that the state should also play a major role in providing basic education and health, since these involve notions of 
equity, which it would be difficult for a commercial company to apply. Esping-Andersen(2002) provides different view.  6 
 
Although there is space for mutual cooperation and discussion regarding the effectiveness of different 
aspects of national policies, which could possibly lead to deeper discussions about the direction and 
guidance of social policy measures, different approaches towards social issues and different cultural 
patterns  among  member  states  make  it  in  many  cases impossible to implement  the  most effective 
practices of one member state into the policy framework of another. However, it is possible to enact 
significant changes that counter the natural direction of social development when those changes are 
promoted by a strong and charismatic personality. Margaret Thatcher, whose far-reaching liberalization 
policies of the 1980s revitalized the UK and reduced the unreasonable power of trade unions within the 
country, provides an appropriate example of this type of charismatic politician. The low frequency of 
industrial strikes has been maintained until the present and her reinvention of the Anglo-Saxon social 
model  has  since  proved  both  sustainable  and  efficient.  The  culture  she  successfully  redefined  and 
reshaped has survived principal political changes with limited corrections. 
Differences in tax rates and national regulations have generated criticism from number of EU new left 
regarding so-called „social dumping“. This concept suggests that lower tax rates or more favourable 
labour market restrictions in certain countries may create incentives strong enough to attract enterprises 
from  countries  with  higher  taxes  and  less  liberal  labour  markets.  Moreover,  „social  dumping“  is 
sometimes connected to the “race to the bottom”, in which countries compete with each other for the 
lowest tax rates and lowest degree of market regulation in order to entice new investors. While critics 
like Wickham (2002) are afraid of an eventual loss of social cohesion, we share the view that it is rather 
ideology than real threat as analysis of Kvist (2004) proved. We wish instead to raise other questions:  
i)  Should lower taxes and reasonable deregulation not be connected with  “race to the top” 
from a developmental point of view subject to the relevant social strategies on a national 
level?  
ii)  In the face of current challenges, do excessive regulations and redistribution resulting from 
the prevailing social models adopted in different countries secure social cohesion within 
Europe? Are those regulations and redistributive measures compatible with a competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in a gradually globalizing world? 
 
We should also at least mention the new Lisbon process as an attempt to focus on “growth and jobs”, 
together with the repercussions it evolved to bring the social agenda back in. The topic of flexicurity is 
also related to ILO 2005 meeting, but what is important is that in the meantime, it was adopted, by the 
EU and remained one of the flagships of the refurbished Lisbon process
5. 
 
In  its  Report  on  a  European  Social  Model  applicable  from  July  2006,  the  European  Parliament 
summarizes the benefits derived from the application of the model as well as its future challenges. It 
states that although particular member countries have different social systems and have used different 
methods in instituting the values of the model, in general they aim to attain a balance based on active 
interdependence between economic growth and social solidarity, which is reflected in the model as a 
unity of values with a diversity of systems. According to the report, in the last 60 years, these values 
have allowed a growing EU to successfully become an area of greater economic prosperity and social 
justice.  
                                                            
5 Spidla,V. 2005, 2006.  7 
 
EP Report declares the leading principles of the reform of the European Social Model (13th July 
2006): 
1.  Stresses the necessity to preserve and enhance the values associated with the European social 
model  –  equality,  solidarity,  individual  rights  and  responsibilities,  non-discrimination  and 
redistribution with access for all citizens to high-quality public services –  in addition to the 
high social standards already achieved; 
2.  Recalls  strongly  that  only  an  EU  based  on  economic  and  social  cohesion  that  defends  its 
common values can be strong enough to defend its interests; 
3.  Is convinced that there is no alternative to urgently reforming economic and social systems 
where they fail to meet the criteria of efficiency and socially sustainable development and where 
they are inadequate to tackle the challenges of demographic change, globalisation and the IT 
revolution; 
4.  Expresses its deep disappointment at the present growth rate in the EU which makes structural 
reform  extremely difficult; 
5.  Is aware of the widespread concerns among EU citizens regarding unemployment - especially 
unemployment among young people - exclusion, poverty, insecurity on the job market, and the 
potential failure of social security systems;... 
The  issue  of  economic  prosperity  and  especially  its  future  projections  is  highly  debatable  and  is 
discussed further in this paper. While keeping these issues in mind, the report acknowledges that there 
is a clear need to modernise and enhance the model in order to respond to demographic changes, meet 
the challenges of globalisation, and increase the adaptability of human resources to rapid technological 
evolution. It underlines the urgent need for a reform of the concept of the European Social Model in 
order for the model to play a productive role in the economy. 
One of this paper’s authors wishes to further comment on the discussion at the European Parliament in 
February 2006.  He finds that the concluding EP compromise is vague, conflicting and confusing and 
overlooks  global  competitiveness  due  to  the  current  absence  of  principal  reform  programs  in  key 
Eurozone countries. Such a situation creates room for the joint activity of smaller and medium size EU 
members  (both  new  and  old)  in  protecting  their  national  policies  in  response  to  the  growing 
competitiveness within the EU. This therefore necessitates a much deeper understanding of the nature 
of social models, which will be explored in the following chapter. 
 8 
 
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL “(SUB)MODELS” AND THEIR IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
As mentioned above, the European Social Model has never been clearly defined
6. As Salais (2005) 
remarks: “European politics in social matters is too much complex, multifaceted and full of internal 
contradiction to be easily grasped with general concepts such as European social model.” Usually, 
when politicians, economists or researchers talk about the European Social (and economic) Model, they 
have two distinctive features of this broad concept in mind: its dissimilarity to the “American model” 
and  the  emphasis  on  economic  growth  that  is  accompanied  by  development  in  the  social  sphere.  
Another important feature of the model is its predominantly normative character (Jepsen and Serrano 
Pascual, 2005); its underlying concepts are based on assumptions that were never established through 
the use of empirical evidence, which impedes serious analysis in further discussions.  
While the name “European Social Model” as such has remained a rather loose term, a variety of other 
national models of social provision have been identified in a more specific manner. The most important 
national differences are apparent in the transfer system, tax-benefit system, welfare policies, and more 
generally in the proportion of state intervention and individually based insurance in the matters of 
pensions, health care, education, etc.  
Studies of these models, or sub-models, have established several distinguishing criteria and have drawn 
comparisons  from  many  different  perspectives.  Currently,  there  are  four  types  of  European  social 
(sub)models  commonly  discussed:  the  Scandinavian  (Nordic)  Social  Democratic  model,  the 
Continental Corporatist model, the Anglo-American (Atlantic) Liberal model, and the Mediterranean 
model. All of them, including Great Britain as the only European representative of the Anglo-American 
model, differ significantly from the American socio-economic model. While the rights to education, 
social security and health care and the universal availability of these services form an inherent part of 
all social systems in Europe, the American model emphasizes individual responsibility. In addition, 
employment  rights,  including  unemployment  and  sick  benefits,  maternity  leave,  the  regulation  of 
working hours, etc., are much more generous in European countries than in the USA.  
The  differences  in  social  policy  between  the  two  continents  are  evident  in  the  Anglo-American 
Liberal Model, which exists in two forms. The first one, adopted by the USA, Australia, and New 
Zealand, is more radical. Benefits are focused almost exclusively on those most in need and are aimed 
at preventing poverty rather than ensuring a certain level of standard of living. Taxes are relatively low 
and labour markets are not heavily regulated. The continental version of the model is used in Great 
Britain. This version of the model is located somewhere in between the American version and other 
types of European models. For example, it employs more active labour market policies and greater 
support for families with children.  
                                                            
6  Social  model  or  “European  social  model”  is  a  frequently  used  but  often  not  so  clearly  defined  notion.  Following 
simplifications made e.g.by V.Semerak we define a social model as a particular configuration of welfare related institutions 
and organization of economic life. Specifically it includes institutions related to: 
•  Organization  of  labour  markets  (minimum  wages,  rules  governing  hiring  and  firing  of  employees,  degree  of 
unionization and the power of unions) 
•  Social system and tax system (level of redistribution and resulting level of inequality) 
•  Pension  system  (the  degree  of  reliance  on  a  compulsory  state  organized  PAYG  system  and  the  level  of 
redistribution included in the system) 
•  The role and power of state in general (direct and indirect influence of state on economic activities, interventions 
into price mechanism, presence of structural or industrial policies)  
 9 
 
The Scandinavian Model, used in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, can be characterized by an active 
employment policy, the significant role of the state, a high level of progressive taxation, and a high rate 
of female employment. In contrast to the Anglo-American model, the role of charity is negligible. The 
social system is almost entirely financed from tax revenues.  
Within the Scandinavian model, specific features of the Danish (sub)model have been recently pointed 
out
7. Its essential pillar is a long-term, sound and stable macro-economic policy oriented towards global 
competitiveness. In addition, it features a purely Danish invention, flexicurity, which is based on the 
belief  that  flexibility  and  security  are  not  contradictory  and  can  actually  be  mutually  supportive 
(Madsen, 2006). Flexicurity consists of a flexible labour market with fewer restrictions on both hiring 
and firing, a high level of social security and an active labour market policy. In addition, the Danish 
(sub)model also has a centralised labour market with responsible social partners. 
In 2005, the International Labor Organization supported the idea that flexibility, stability and security 
on the labour market need not be mutually exclusive and asserted that there were several Western 
European countries which have managed to balance all of these factors.  For example, countries with 
more  flexible  labour  markets  such  as  Denmark,  Finland  or  the  Netherlands  experience  higher 
employment rates than France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain, where the labour markets are more 
rigid.  
In November 2006, the European Commission has launched a broad public debate on the need to 
review the labour law systems. The discussion paper (Green Paper on Modernising labour law to meet 
the challenges of the 21st century) will ask Member States, employers and workers’ representatives 
how labour law at EU and national level can help the job market become more flexible while improving 
security  for  workers.  The  consultation  will  remain  open  until  March  2007.  All earlier drafts were 
entitled “Adapting labour law to ensure flexibility and security for all”. The change of title reflects 
criticism from employers’ associations and member states such as Sweden and the UK, which said that 
the paper was pre-empting the results of the consultation for which it is the basis, rather than leaving 
policy options open. As any national specific model also flexicurity is not a problem-free. 
From the beginning of the 1990s until 2005, the unemployment rate in Denmark fell from 12% to 5.5%. 
However, it is important to note that this positive development was not accompanied by a similarly 
successful increase in the employment rate. The number of people of working age that receive public 
transfer payments increased and the number of people in activation programmes like subsidized job 
training  and  job  search  assistance  courses  did  not  fall  with  the  decline  in  unemployment  figures 
                                                            
￿ 
7 Flexicurity was one of the main issues discussed at the European Regional Meeting of the International Labour 
Organization held in February 2005 in Budapest - Hungary. 
￿  Danish  Prime  Minister  Anders  Fogh  Rasmussen  gave  a  speech  on the  Danish  model  at  the  UMP  conference on 
economic challenges held in September 2005 in Paris - France. 
￿  Per Kongshoj Madsen from the University of Aalborg presented his paper on flexicurity as a new perspective on labour 
markets and welfare states in Europe at the Informal meeting of EU Employment and Social Policy Ministers held in 
January 2006 in Villach, Austria. 
￿  In  January  2006,  French  Prime  Minister  Dominique  de  Villepin  proposed  a  new  set  of  measures  based  on  the 
„flexicurity“ model. One of reasons was to fight long-term unemployment indicating social exclusion. 
￿  Denmark’s current low unemployment figures and its low social exclusion rates, coupled to output growth of over 3% 
have led the European Union to adopt flexicurity as its leitmotiv in its European Employment Strategy. In particular, 
Guideline No.21 of the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Employment for the period 2005-2008 calls on Member 
States to “…promote flexibility combined with employment security and reduce labour market segmentation, having 
due regard to the role of the social partners”. 10 
 
(Andersen and Svarer, 2006). It increases segment of frictional unemployment that is relatively high in 
Denmark. But Danish employees change jobs more than 800,000 times a year, which means that about 
one third of the labour force starts a new job each year (Rasmussen, 2005). Finally, high employment in 
the public sector also contributes to low unemployment levels. While in Denmark 32.9% of employees 
work in the public sector, in Germany only 12.2% of employees do so (Gregor, 2006). Recent change in 
Swedish government illustrates well the growing dissatisfaction of population with current Swedish 
version of Scandinavian model that lead to the critical loss of Swedish performance and competitivness 
in  the  last  decades  as  demonstrated  by  Munhhammar  J.,2006a,2006b. One should not idealize  the 
Scandinavian model and deal with its deeper performance and cultural features carefully. 
The Continental Corporatist Model is primarily used in Germany and France. This model places a 
strong emphasis on the role of labour law, which is elaborated to great detail. The working conditions 
of more than 90% of German employees are determined by collective bargaining. The employees also 
participate  to  quite  a  large  extent  in  the  decision  making  processes  within  enterprises.  Another 
characteristic aspect of the model is the important role of the principle of subsidiarity, which entails an 
increased role of non-state institutions in the provision of public services. The role of women in society 
differs from that of the Scandinavian Model; female employment is very low and women tend to play a 
role within society that has been described by the term familism (e.g. Ostner, Reif and Turba, 2003).  
The Mediterranean Model, primarily used in Italy, Greece, and Spain was until recently considered as 
a part of the group of Continental models with which it shares many similar characteristics. Social 
services  are  mainly  financed  through  employees’  payments.  There  is  no  comprehensive  protection 
system,  i.e.  no  guarantee  of  minimal  income.  Relevant  decisions  are  made  at  the  regional  level, 
consequently contributing to large regional differences.  
In  the  report  of the  Independent  High-Level  Study  Group established  through  the  initiative  of  the 
President of the European Commission (2005), Sapir defines the four types of social models listed 
above, and in addition argues that the notion of a single European Social Model is largely misleading 
since particular types of social models perform differently in terms of “efficiency” and “equity”. A 
model is considered efficient if it provides sufficient incentives to work and equitable if it keeps the risk 
of  poverty  relatively  low.  Based  on  these  two  criteria,  Sapir  examines  the  typology  of  European 
(sub)models. He concludes that the Continental and Mediterranean models, which together account for 
two-thirds of the GDP of the entire EU-25 and 90% of the GDP of the 12-member Eurozone, are 
inefficient and unsustainable in light of the opportunities offered by globalization
8. On the other hand, 
he  considers  both  the  Nordic  and  Anglo-Saxon  Models  efficient,  but  states  that  only  the  former 
manages  to  combine  both  equity  and  efficiency.  However,  a  model  that  is  not  equitable  may  be 
sustainable,  whereas  an  inefficient  model  is  not.  Therefore,  it  is  more  essential  to  move  towards 
efficiency than towards convergence. 
 
                                                            
8 See also Aiginger,Guger (2006) 11 
 
























Source: Sapir (2005) 
 
Differences in employment rate and the probability of excaping poverty (described as poverty rate), 
according to which particular (sub)models can be distinguished, are provided also by Sapir and depicted 
in the Chart 2.  
 
Chart 2: Employment rates and the probability of escaping poverty 
 
Source: Sapir (2005) 
Table 2 illustrates the differences in additional indicators that quantify the role of the state, inequality 
and  the  economic  performance  of  countries  with  respect  to  the  above-mentioned  (sub)models. 
Indicators for the USA and the Czech Republic are also included. While the indicators’ values vary 
greatly across particular European states, none of them reach the indicator values of the USA, where a 
significantly lower level of redistribution and higher inequality go hand in hand with better economic 
performance.  12 
 
 
Table 2: Selected economic and social indicators 
Governmental 
expenses (2003; % of 
GDP)
Share of poorest 
quintile in income (The 
most recent year 
available; 2002)
Share of public health 
expenditures on total 
health expenditures 
(2002; % of GDP)
GDP growth (1990-
2003; average annual 
% growth)
Gini index (2000, 1999 
UK, 1996 Czech R. %)
Sweden 37.2 9.1 84.8 2.3 25.0
Germany 32.8 8.5 78.9 1.5 28.3
Italy 39.6 6.5 75.3 1.6 36.0
UK 39.7 6.1 83.1 2.7 36.0
Czech Republic 38.2 10.3 91.4 1.4 25.4
USA 21.0 5.4 45.2 3.3 40.8  
Sources: World Bank – 2005 World Development Indicators; United Nations – Human Development Report 2005 
Regardless of the type of social model to which they subscribe, the European countries have a higher 
level of redistribution, more favourable inequality indicators, and greater availability of public health 
and  other  social services than the USA;  however,  the USA performs better economically. Chart 3 
depicts a more long-term comparison of the economic development of European countries with that of 
the USA. In addition, the chart includes the much higher growth rate of Chinese and Indian economies 
for the purposes of comparison. 
Chart 3: GDP growth 
India India India India
China China China China
India India India India
China China China China
 
 
Source: EU Growth Trends at the Economy-Wide and Industry Levels, European Commission, April 2006; World Bank, 
2006 World Development Indicators 13 
 
 
Not only is the recent and current development of European economic growth worse in comparison to 
that of the USA, but the outlook for future development and current dynamic aspects of the economy 
are also of crucial importance. We demonstrate future threats in Chart 4 and Chart 5. 
We concur with De Vlieghere and Vreymans’ (2006) assessment that “the reality of Europe’s ailing 
economy contrasts sharply with its economic potential and with the massive resources employed to 
cure its ailing growth. The whole arsenal of Keynesian remedies has now been tried and has failed one 
by one. Massive deficit spending throughout the eighties and nineties has left Europe with a public debt 
unequalled in history. The size of Europe's monumental public debt is only surpassed by the hidden 
liabilities  accumulated  in  Europe’s  shortsighted  pay-as-you-go  public  pension  schemes.  Unfunded 
pension liabilities now average some 285% of GDP more than 4 times the officially published public 
debt figures. Total public liabilities now exceed assets in most EU countries, and are causing runaway 
debt service.  Unfortunately, this will just kill growth completely. Europe’s present social model is 
unsustainable because it is based on robbery of future generations…the workforce is de-motivated, and 
that Europe’s personnel and managers are increasingly rebelling against the persistent confiscation of 
over 50% of the fruit of their labour.“  
Chyba! 
Chart 4: Public debt and state pension liabilities (in % of GDP) 
 
Source : De Vlieghere Vreymans (2006) based upon ABN Amro(2003) and Hedbávný, Schneider, Zápal (2004) 
 
In Chart 4 the state pension liabilities were calculated using the net present value of the implicit debt of 
publicly-run  state  pension  schemes  to  predict  the  debt  accumulated  by  2050,  based  on  unchanged 
policies.  We  agree  with  Hedbávný,  Schneider  and  Zápal  (2004),  who  point  out  that  widely  used 
European measures and frameworks are inadequate:  “neither Stability and Growth Pact rules nor their 
pre-EMU counterpart, the Maastricht criteria, take into account unfunded liabilities of governmental 14 
 
programs.  They  tackle  just  explicit  deficits  and  debts.  Subsequently,  politicians  replace  budgetary 
outlays with promises, the costs of which will be born by future taxpayers”
9. 
Here  one  should  temper  the  above  statements  with  the  admission  that  the  off-budget  liabilities 
accumulated in Europe’s short-sighted pay-as-you-go public pension schemes are a function of the 
current country specific level of key parameters (such as retirement age, contribution rate, defined 
benefits, etc.) reflecting current political status, as implied in the term “unchanged policies”. Due to 
their sensitivity to parameter change (e.g. rise in the statutory retirement age), a guaranteed reduction of 
those  hidden  liabilities  is  critically  dependent  on  political  will  and  therefore  not  easily  predicted. 
Lowering the current social comfort due to the internalization of future costs is politically painful.   
 
As reflected in Joint report EC on social protection and Inclusion (2007) after huge effort „pension 
schemes generally manage to ensure adequate retirement income in most Member States at present, in 
particular statutory schemes and those private schemes that are spread widely in terms of coverage. 
Future  adequacy  and,  in  particular,  future  levels  of  pensions  in  relation  to  earnings  (income 
replacement  levels)  will  depend  notably  on  the  pace of accrual of pension entitlements (which is 
linked to developments in the labour market), the maturation of pension schemes, the indexation of 
benefits and the effect of reforms introduced.“(p.32 report Annex) The globalization and aging are, 
however, only multiplying core problems
10 : “A job is the best safeguard against poverty and social 
exclusion…(with limited problem of in-work poverty)“. 
 
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL “(SUB)MODELS” AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
As depicted in Chart 5, deep structural changes on the labour market are obviously much more growth 
enhancing in the USA than in Europe. In historical terms, during the 1970s, unemployment in the USA 
increased,  but  even  more  so  in  Western  European  countries.  In  the  1980s  and  1990s,  American 
unemployment went down while simultaneously wage inequality increased significantly. In contrast, 
European unemployment fluctuated without any important changes and wage inequality changed only 
slightly. Throughout the 1980s and until the mid-1990s, Europe experienced higher growth in labour 
productivity than the USA. However, starting in late 1990s, productivity in the USA began to accelerate 
and rapidly overtook Europe, which might have important consequences for the future development of 
European economies. These disparities can broadly be explained by technological progress and the 
diffusion of innovation, in which Europe has been lagging behind (Trichet, 2006). What then about the 
labour market? 
 
                                                            
9 Hedbávný, Schneider and Zápal (2004) suggest the use of a mechanism they call the Sustainability Council. „This would 
allow to prepare for a fast increase in expenditures as babyboomers head for their retirement and will draw public pensions 
and use public health care programs enthusiastically.“ See EC age related expenditure projections in Canoy,Smith (2006). 
 
10 Canoy,Smith (2006) properly declare: „The problems that social and labour market institutions are facing today are often 
attributed to globalization and aging. This article argues that globalization merely exposes inherent weaknesses in social 
institutions while aging aggravates them...“ See also results of more theoretical approach of Boeri at al.(1999). 15 
 






















Source: Gretschmann (2006) 
In many cases European labour markets need more flexible rules, which would encourage competitive 
behaviour  and  the  development  of  forward-looking  structural  changes.  Chart  5  demonstrates  that 
European “comfort-oriented” economic practices protect the least productive sectors, while US (and 
Chinese) market driven tendencies do exactly the opposite. These diverging labour allocations not only 
signal ex post trends but also ex ante, longer-term structural changes that could potentially cause a 
further decline in competitiveness multiplied by diverging hours worked
11. 
To remain competitive with quickly economically growing countries such as India and China, Europe 
should use to its advantage its solid human capital resources as well as give more extensive support to 
education, research and innovation in order to increase productivity. According to OECD data from 
June 2006, European Union countries spend on average two thirds of the proportion of their GDP that 
the USA spends on research and development, while Japan spends an even larger amount (see Chart 6). 
Here one must be careful not to confuse quantity and quality of education and should avoid a deep 
structural  mismatch  of  longer-term  demand  and  the  supply  of  an  educated  population
12.  Such  a 
mismatch often results from blind financial intervention by the government and regulation inspired by 
“good intentions.” The authors believe that a more adequate form of university funding, like the English 
system of higher education funding based on income contingent loans, can mitigate such a problem.  
It is worth repeating that these suggested measures are not limited to the strict necessity of investing in 
research and development. As Švejnar (2004) argues, unlike the USA, which has eliminated most of its 
inefficiencies and must now look to inventions and innovation for growth, Europe still has considerable 
unexploited  possibilities  (X-inefficiencies)  that  can  propel  it  rapidly  forward  such  as  inappropriate 
labour market institutions.  We agree and posit that greater flexibility in European labour markets, as 
instituted within  the  framework of the social models mentioned above, would support competitive 
behaviour  and  forward-looking  structural  changes  and  reward  it  accordingly.  Given  the  legislative 
                                                            
11 See policy background discussion of European preference for leisure in Alesina,Glaesar,Sacerdote (2005). 
12 Number of those disequilibria can be identified e.g. within Italian higher education system.   16 
 
initiatives planned for the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006 (interim report on the transitional 
measures, final report of the “skills and mobility” action plan, proposal for a directive on the portability 
of  pension  rights,  launch  of  Europass  and  of  the  new  European  portal  on  workers’  mobility),  the 
ECommission has proposed making 2006 the European Year of Workers’ Mobility but the impact of 
that fact has been  rather limited and symbolical. 
Part of the reason for this can be attributed to the worldwide development of service sector that has 
dominated GDP formation during last decades. The failure to open the services sector to the European 
single market, which was ostensibly one of the European integration building pillars, contributes to the 
further  perpetuation  of  inefficiencies  in  the  most  dynamic  sector  of  the  economy.  A  comparable 
dynamic  service  sector  is  highly  productive  in  the  US,  but  less  so  in  Europe.  Unfortunately,  the 
reluctance of politicians to confront the politically painful impacts of both service market liberalization 
and  the  implementation  of  legislation  promoting  increased  labour  market  mobility  in  Europe 
13 
overshadows the potential gains resulting from the elimination of inefficiencies within the services 
sector.  The  socially  and  politically  painful  reallocation  of  employment  from  the  least  to  the  more 
productive sectors is absent. It is no surprise then that there is a lack of demand for research and 
development in Europe; it can hardly be rooted in the well-protected, least productive sectors. And the 
state interventions in the field of human capital development and R&D can often be counterproductive 
in such unfriendly market conditions.   
 
Chart 6: Gross Domestic Expenditures on R&D as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, June 2006
                                                            
13 See the case of French discussion over Polish plumbers at the last part of this paper.  
 
Building  upon  earlier  ESM  definition,  it  is  easy  to understand that structural changes are very 




1.  Configuration of social model has clear implication for the efficiency, speed, and stability of 
structural change. Speed of changes in an economy with excessive level of redistribution and 
high unemployment benefits is likely to suffer from employees’ lower motivation to improve 
their qualification or look for work in other sectors  or regions. On the other hand, fast 
structural changes in an economy without reasonable welfare system may lead to public 
discontent and subsequent reversal of reforms. 
2.  The speed of structural change matters for the stability of social models. Drastic shocks that 
cause sudden increases in unemployment may lead to serious problems of existing social 
system. 
 
Then we can understand the opinion of EC 2006 : „There is broad consistency between the National 
Reform Programmes (NRPs) and Member State commitments at EU level in terms of social 
policies through the open method of coordination for social inclusion, pensions and health. The 
NRPs recognise that the exclusion of people and groups from participation in society and the labour 
market is a waste of resources which should be addressed for economic and social justice reasons. 
Pension reforms aimed at strengthening sustainability are improving the incentives for working 
longer. The adequacy of pensions now depends on opening labour markets for older people and 
fighting segmentation. Some NRPs (especially in new Member States) stress the importance of 
health issues as a precondition for raising the quantity and quality of labour :  Ensure inclusive 
labour markets, enhance work attractiveness, and make work pay for job-seekers, including 
disadvantaged people, and the inactive“. 
The  protection  of  numerous  inefficient  domestic  service  jobs  is  short-sighted  and  blocks 
spontaneous structural changes supported both by flexible labor markets and by number of other 
critical conditions developed by Aghion et al (2006) such as more international competition and 
entry  on  the  product  markets,  more  developed  internationalized  financial  sectors  and  markets 
besides larger and more efficient investment in higher education. 
 
EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODELS AND THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES: EACH STATE 
SHOULD LEARN FROM THE BEST PRACTICES AND AVOID THE WORST PRACTICES  
Although the social role of the state differs significantly between Western European countries, as 
demonstrated in the above-mentioned social (sub)models, the contrast is even more significant in 
the comparison between Eastern and Western Europe. In words of Bohle and Greskovitz (2004), the 
“European Social Model …has not travelled to the East” yet.   
In 2001, social expenditures in all the new member states remained below the EU-15 average. The 
Baltic countries (together with Ireland) followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia had 
the lowest social expenditures in the EU (see Table 3). 18 
 

















EE 14.3 42.6 31.0 14.6 7.8 1.3 2.2 0.6
LV 14.3 56.4 19.1 10.1 9.6 3.6 0.6 0.7
LT 15.2 47.5 30.0 8.3 8.8 1.9 2.3 1.2
SK 19.1 38.2 35.0 8.2 8.1 3.6 6.5 0.4
CZ 19.2 42.5 34.6 8.2 8.5 3.1 2.7 0.6
HU 19.8 42.4 27.5 12.9 10.3 3.4 1.0 2.5
PL 22.1 55.3 19.2 7.8 13.3 4.3 0.2 0.0
SI 25.5 45.5 31.4 8.9 8.7 3.7 1.8 0.0
Average 18.7 46.3 28.5 9.9 9.4 3.1 2.2 0.8
EU-15 27.6 46.1 28.0 8.0 8.2 6.3 1.5 2.1
Structure of social expenditure (% of total)
 
Source: Keune (2006) 
In terms of economic performance, although the GDP growth of Central and Eastern European 
countries is obviously higher than the growth rates in Western Europe, these countries’ development 
growth cannot be compared to that of the ex-Soviet countries. In their paper, Aslund and Jenish 
(2006) find that since 2000 the Commonwealth of Independent States countries have had more than 
4  percentage  points  higher  annual  growth  than  the  Central  European  countries.  Based  on  a 
regression analysis, they claim that the reduction in public expenditures has been the most effective 
stimulus of economic growth. Moreover, they find that the further from the European Union the 
country is located, the higher its economic growth. This is partly due to the catching-up process –
given reasonable institutional conditions, a lower GDP base and underutilized growth potential open 
space for more rapid growth – but certain part of growth might be also due to the liberalization 
framework adopted by those countries. 
When the people in European countries were asked how satisfied they were with their life, there was 
a significant difference between the responses in the EU-15 countries and the new member states. 
While the satisfaction index of the EU-15 reached 7.3 out of 10, citizens of the new member states 
rated  their  well-being  at  only  6.1  (European  Foundation  for  the  Improvement  of  Living  and 
Working Conditions; 2003). Not surprisingly, the unemployment level emerged in the research as 
one  of  the  most  important  factors  affecting  the  level  of  satisfaction.  Moreover, workers in the 
Eastern countries also work more hours per week and work safety is often lower, as well as union 
density.  
On the other hand, it is necessary to add that social benefits applied in the labour market very often 
undermine and reduce the incentives of the unemployed to find a new job. The more targeted the 
benefits are to the poorest groups, the more they interfere with work incentives (Schneider and 
Jelínek, 2001, Tvrdon, 2006). Also, other policy measures such as increasing minimum wage and 
subsistence level affect employment development in a negative way. Therefore, generous social 
benefits can contribute to higher unemployment and prevent needed structural changes and limit 
mobility.  How  those  Central  Eastern  European  countries  fit  into  simplified  models  or  do  they 
represent a specific submodel?   
European  Commission  report  Employment  in  Europe  2006  in  its  5th  chapter  clustered  18  EU 
Member States inluding new member states into groups based on flexicurity systems/models by 19 
 
PCA-CLA methodology
14.   This EC report identified five country groups including submodel in 
the Easter Europe (plus Italy) :  
1.  the Anglo-Saxon system (the UK and Ireland were included there),  
2.  the Nordic system (including Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland) 
3.  the Continental system, (Germany, Belgium, Austria and France)  
4.  the Mediterranean system, (Spain, Portugal and Greece)  
5.  the Eastern European (plus Italy) system including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia and Italy   
In their study for EALE 2007 conference Eamets, Phillips et al. (2007) tried to develop this PCA-
CLA approach further for more EU member states that resulted in six different country groups. 
Then they tried to characterize each of these country groups by certain weak and strong features 
from the labour market performance point of view (they calculated average value of variables used 
in principal component analysis by different country groups, see Table 4):  
The results of Eamets at al (2007) with respect to the flexicurity features suggest certain split of the  
Eastern European EU member countries ESM submodels into two groups – more dynamic Baltic 
and somewhat cumbersome Visegrad countries
15. Anyway in spite of differences we can monitor 
rather slow (or sometimes even neglectable) legal incorporation of the Continental social model 
(prevailing in Eurozone) in rapidly growing and increasingly competitive Eastern European new EU 
member states resulting from, among other reasons, subjective perceptions and inclinations towards 
a more individualistic approach following the collapse of the socialist era. According to Večerník 
(1993), as people sought to escape socialist paternalism and enforced social entitlements such as 
unified corporate housing or corporate holidays, the general perception of the word “social” became 
increasingly negative. However, attitudes change in the course of time, and the initial optimism 
towards  capitalism  and  individualism  was  slowly  dampened.  Although  working  and  living 
conditions have not deteriorated considerably for majority of the population, an increasing number 
of citizens are again becoming attracted by the state protection of jobs and rents and price control. A 
large number of people have also been attracted by the “social market” model, and the percentage of 
people supporting a return to “real socialism” more than doubled in the period between the 1992 





                                                            
14 Member States were classified in a particular group/system according to an overall measure of “distance” (between 
countries) reflecting the scores obtained for the principal dimensions (identified in the principal component - PCA 
analysis)  that characterise flexicurity systems (e.g.security, flexibility, etc.) and clustered then through K-cluster or 
hierarchical cluster analysis based upon calculated scores. PCA itself is a multivariate analysis technique that aims to 
evaluate how different variables are associated with each other. See the report. 
 
15 It is not anything surprising. I agree with V.Semerak comments : „to ensure economic and political stability, the social 
model must be consistent with the level of economic development, the intensity of structural changes, and social 
preferences of the population (at least the preferences of the median voter). On the one hand, the Visegrad countries are 
located in the same geographical space as Austria and Germany and share with these two countries also large part of 
their history. This could suggest that at least as far as preferences of voters are concerned, the Visegrad countries may be 
relatively close to the “Continental model”. This being true, there are two important aspects that would cast some doubts 
on these predictions. Firstly, the experience of the last 50 years (centrally planned economy + subsequent substantial 
transition) substantially changed the intellectual climate in the Visegrad countries. Secondly, even if the voters’ 
preferences were the same, the countries cannot afford so developed welfare states as the richer EU members.” 20 
 
Table 4. Average value of variables used in PCA sorted by different country groups 
















Total expenditure on social protection (% 
of GDP)  28,4  27,4  29,8  14,7  22,9  21,2 
Total expenditure on social protection per 
head  7769,0  7347,3  8651,7  2165,9  3957,6  2453,0 
Tenure  37,6  30,0  37,3  24,8  29,8  34,4 
Unemployment insurance  37,2  23,0  39,0  18,0  16,6  13,2 
Easiness of finding new job  16,2  29,0  35,0  27,2  9,8  12,8 
Mobility  7,8  18,0  21,0  6,8  6,2  4,4 
Training  25,2  38,0  43,3  23,2  15,0  21,4 
Life-long learning  8,2  19,3  28,6  7,3  4,2  7,3 
Part-time workers  18,2  35,4  19,1  10,8  8,4  5,7 
Long-term unemployment rate  37,7  24,6  21,2  38,5  44,7  52,8 
Unemployment rate of the young  15,4  9,3  14,8  16,3  21,3  24,9 
Employment rate of 55-64 years old   33,1  49,9  59,5  48,1  39,3  29,2 
Gini coefficient  27,6  30,5  24,7  31,4  33,4  27,2 
Poverty (50%)  7,6  8,5  5,7  10,2  11,8  8,6 
Trust  29,6  45,0  63,0  24,2  24,8  20,6 
Early school leavers  12,2  15,5  9,2  14,3  31,8  6,7 
Note: yelow/grey area indicates best performance in terms of flexicurity; numbers in bold indicate worst performance. 
Their results are similar and confirmed by „common sense“: 
1.  UK  and  Netherlands  represent  the  Anglo-Saxon  model  with  quite  liberal  and  flexible  labour  markets,  low 
unemployment,  high mobility  and quite high general trust. 
2.  The cluster of Denmark, Sweden, Finland has its common „flexicurity“ features (described as a Nordic Model)  and 
all Nordic countries have top scores in most of the indictors presented in table of Eamets,Phillips et al.(2007) and 
are used as a benchmark then. 
3.  The  continental  economic  and  social  model  is  reflected  by  a  cluster  of  the  old  EU  member  states –  Austria, 
Belgium,  France,  Germany  and  Luxembourg.  The  preffered  high  social  protection  is  complemented  by 
comparatively the worst tenure suggesting the rigid labour market with one of the lowest mobility. 
4.  The cluster of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Spain (described as South European or Mediterranean Model) is 
characterised with poor labour market adaptability and low income protection. Surprisingly low are training and 
education indicators. Unemployment is at relatively high and employment relatively low level. 
5.  In the fifth rather heterogeneous cluster Eamets at al (2007) grouped fast growing, low-income economies in Baltics 
(Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia), Cyprus and high-income Ireland. Labour market flexibility indicators in this group are 
relatively high, but social protection is lowest in EU and also income protection is at relatively low level. Eamets at 
al (2007) are afraid of some indicators being probably overestimated and some underestimated.  
6.  The last group represents new member states from Central Europe – Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia 
and Poland, labelled some times as Visegard countries (except Slovenia). Eamets et al (2007) are of the opinion  
that from the point of view of flexicurity together with Mediterranean countries this group is not doing very well. 
Labour market mobility is relatively low and long-term unemployment rate is high, elderly employment rate is low – 




EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODELS AND THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES DOMESTIC 
AND FOREIGN POLICIES  
Policy discussion of different European Social (and Economic) Models further pointed out the issue 
of the impact of Eastern European EU enlargement on the growth of the old EU member states. We 
share the opinion of D.Daianu (2006) that “eastern enlargement is not solely to blame for the pain 
currently  being  experienced  by  EU  member  states,  though  it  may  have  accentuated  these 
problems...” having  their both external and internal roots. We agree to include among external 
factors both “the race for competitiveness in today’s world and the rise of economies in Asia...and 
among internal factors the inner dynamics of European societies (demographics, the crisis of the 
welfare state)” but we should consider deeper relevant policy options for Eastern European social 
(and economic) submodels in future. And then we should raise an issue - are any Eastern European 
submodels stable and sustainable ? 
Originally cumbersome legislative application of inefficient forms of the European social model 
disregarding new member states’ domestic conditions has been recently significantly refined under 
the umbrella of the harmonization of the acquis communitaire“ by several governments due to a 
political cycle (and new institutional labour market rigidities were born). It is perhaps nonsensical to 
discuss harmonization when the most of the social and economic rights of EU citizens still remain 
at the level of their individual member state. Nevertheless recently some Eastern European unionists 
have begun to defend their requirements by a reference to the European Social Model having in 
mind its inefficient continental form (or in another hidden modification refering to the average 
Eurozone figures with prevailing 90% GDP weight of countries with continental model) . It is 
beyond any doubt that by definition, the implementation of the inefficient Continental European 
social model promoted by some trade unionists, with the support of the short-sighted (mostly left-
wing) governments, might undermine the competitiveness of the new EU member states and the 
goals of up-dated Lisbon agenda. In fact, the Continental model itself is currently under pressure to 
be reformed and some flexicurity model features are recommended policy in support of Lisbon 
agenda by some of EU policy-makers and by number of social democrats
16.  Some Nordic insiders 
themselves such as Munkhammar (2006, 2007) are criticizing how superficial and oversimplified 
judgements are made around Nordic countries and flexicurity model and show its current efficiency 
limits. The political agenda of number of several governments with long-term goals is pushing 
forward the policies with Anglo-Saxon model (even in Sweden). In fact the issues around European 
social (and economic) models are getting a highly political issue both at EU level and at national 
scale representing more and more the main agenda of political parties, one of the main stakes in the 
political  struggle  between  the  left  and  right  –  what  should  be  the  future  models  of  capitalism 
accepted both by the member states and by EU as a whole
17.  
An interesting foreign policy example is a slogan which well illustrates this debate and that recently 
proved to be very effective. It was found on French billboards representing “Polish plumbers.” As a 
part of their May 2005 French campaign, opponents of the new European constitution struck fear 
into the hearts of French voters by conjuring an image of invading armies of low-wage “Polish 
plumbers” who would wrench jobs from hardworking locals. Hence migrating new member state 
citizens  would  capture  old  member  state´s    service  jobs.  Although  there  is  a  chronic  lack  of 
plumbers in Paris, voters overwhelmingly rejected the constitution.  
                                                            
16 See Spidla (2006) and number of recent EU policy papers. See also Enlargement and ESM Bucharest Policy network 
of Social Democrats Conferences (2006,2007). 
17 See social democratic Dimensions of ESM (2007), On the other side the program of new centre-right wing Swedish 
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As a response, the Poles have turned insult into opportunity. The Polish National Tourism Office 
launched a billboard campaign in France featuring a blond Pole dressed in plumber’s overalls who 
declares: “I’m staying in Poland. Come visit.” According to the tourism office, the ad campaign has 
been a huge success. The publicity campaign was “a humoristic wink to get people to visit Poland, 
but also a political wink at the Polish plumber ... who stands for the xenophobic feeling” said Pierre 
Lequiller, head of the French parliament’s delegation to the European Union. In addition, in favour 
of the free circulation of workers within the framework of European bilateral deals, a campaign 
launched by the Swiss Socialist Party also features a similar character, with the slogan “Plumbers of 
the world, unite!” in reference to the famous slogan and last words of the Communist Manifesto, 
“Workers  of  the  world,  unite!”  Finally,  reflecting  the  empirical  data  that  showed  an  excess  of 
demand, the French “plumber sector” has been recently included among the first service sectors to 
open to international competition. This volte-face illustrates well the paradoxical development of 
topics relevant to the rigid, continental European Social Model and foreign policy issues within EU 
that could be easily extended to external foreign policies of some EU member states.  
Rather than promoting phrases and slogans that lead to suspicion on the part of citizens, a sentiment 
which is to a large extent historically justified, there should be deeper analysis of the impacts of 
different elements of the social (and economic) models (recognizing the best practice from the worst 
practice not in the superficial indicators), leading to the consequent application of relevant policy 
measures addressing challenges different from the past within specific national framework
18.  
Eastern European countries must engage in a deeper public discussion of the pros and cons of 
various diverse social (and economic) models, while taking into account the effects of different 
social  models  on  the  past  and future competitiveness of the countries  that have adopted them. 
Rather than fixating on the past, they should assume a more forward-looking approach and allow 
those models to compete in the creation of new opportunities while maintaining full respect for the 
minimum  harmonized  standards  (such  as  the  social  safety  net).  We  have  arrived  to  the  same 
conclusion as recent pragmatic study of Canoy,Smith, 2006: “There is no inherent trade-off between 
social and economic policies, but to reconcile policies comprehensive modernization is needed”. In 
addition, another crucial and relevant factor must be considered: the institutional framework of the 
bureaucratic burden should not only be reduced by „EU Better regulation“ policies, or incentives-
oriented policies, on paper, but in reality as well. 
As  we  have  seen the globalization (including the  growing role of  Chinese  supply and  demand 
growth) increases competitiveness, international trade and structural change including the growing 
role of competitive service sector. It cannot be easily achieved only by current EU opening the 
tradables to foreign trade competition but also by rapid development of single EU service market 
                                                            
18 It still remains valid that people in Eastern Europe are a bit distrustful of political slogans, due to their experience with 
Marxist ideology. Citizens of these countries might perceive some elements of the debates on the European Social 
Model as echoes of the past. According to Singer (2005), in response to increasing economic problems within socialist 
countries, genuine Marxists experienced the following ideological development during the last century. Singer suggests 
that we are situated between the points 4 and 5.  
1.  Our idea is both right and superior. 
2.  The idea is right, but some errors occurred in its implementation. 
3.  The idea is right, but the wrong people are implementing it. 
4.  The idea is right, but the conception of the policies is wrong; however, when we change them, everything 
will be all right. 
5.  Everything is wrong, but the idea is right in principle. 
6.  The idea might not be as good as it initially seemed to be. 
7.  The idea itself is wrong. 
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that should trigger further produtivity gains and not hamper the growth
19. In any case the protection 
of numerous inefficient domestic service jobs is short-sighted and blocks spontaneous structural 
changes supported both by flexible labor markets and by more international competition and entry 
on the product markets, more investment in higher education and more developed internationalized 
financial sectors and markets (see Aghion, 2006). The responsible politicians should not be blind to 
the fact that historical features of still prevailing continental European Social Model are shared 
neither by Anglo-Saxon countries nor by the Asian dynamic economies (Chinese, Indian, South 
Asian) nor by the rest of world and try to update 
As  V.Semerak  has  shown  in  section  5  of  the  first  part  of  Mejstrik,Chytilova,Semerak(2007),  
changes in the structure of production have been clearly linked to substantial structural changes. The 
fact  that  the  former  centrally  planned  economies  started  their  effort  aimed  at  increasing  the 
standards  of  living  of  their  population  by  introducing  policies  that  contributed  to  increasing 
inequality  and  the  reliance  on  the  flexibility  and  mobility  of  labour  during  reforms  sharply 
contrasted with traditional understanding of role of welfare state in original member countries. At 
the same time the welfare states of the same original countries were getting under pressure from 
increasingly  globalized  markets  which  led  to  discussions  about  reforms  of  their  own  welfare 
systems. Although Europe was experiencing problems even before reforms in CEE countries fully 
unfolded and the relative position of Europe in the world economy was not developing too well (see 
Section 2 od the first subchapter), in the eyes of many this pressure for changes coincided with the 
efforts to re-integrate the former socialist economies back to European economy. Many interest 
groups that feared possible impacts of the welfare reforms on their own status therefore started 
viewing  even  the  reintegration  of  the  newcomers  as  a  threat.  On  the  other  hand,  some  of  the 
measures  suggested  by  the  advocates  of  the  traditional  approach  (restrictions  to  mobility  of 
workforce, limited mobility of services, labour and social standards) could be rightfully viewed as a 
threat by the new member countries as the measures could restrict their ability to continue with 
reforms and structural changes as necessary. 
As we said above, although there is space for mutual cooperation and discussion regarding the 
effectiveness  of  different  aspects  of  national  policies,  which  could  possibly  lead  to  deeper 
discussions  about  the  direction  and  guidance  of  social  policy  measures,  different  approaches 
towards social issues and different cultural patterns among member states make it in many cases 
impossible to implement the most effective practices of one member state into the policy framework 
of another. However, it is possible to enact significant changes that counter the natural direction of 
social  development  when  those  changes  are  promoted  by  a  strong  and  charismatic  political 
personality that is able and willing to face the challenges of their uneven impacts. Different time 
horizon of rather remote benefits and the short-term painful impacts is usually amplified by negative 
impacts being highly concentrated within few regions or sectors. Intensive discussions about the 
benefits of different social models, taking into account both equity and sustainable efficiency is a 
certain guarantee that the appearance of a strong and charismatic personality will not result in the 
sort of populism that sacrifices the well-being of future generations for short-term comfort.  
 
                                                            
19 In that respect one could learn a lesson from Japan that experienced the similar problems with its competitive foreign 
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Annex: Public Goods 
According to its original definition, public goods fulfil two criteria: they are both non-rival and non-
excludable, which means that the consumption of the good by one individual does not affect the 
availability of the good for others, and at the same time, it is not possible to exclude anybody from 
the consumption of the good. Since there is little motivation to provide a desirable quantity of 
public goods, their availability can sometimes be insufficient due to the free rider problem, and as a 
response,  state  ownership  and  full  care  for  these  types  of  goods  is  considered  to  be  the  most 
appropriate.  
However, increases in technological development have narrowed the variety of public goods. For 
example, as a consequence of the implementation of electronic toll systems, highways have became 
quasi-private goods since it is possible to exclude consumers from its usage. In terms of the creation 
of the incentives in such cases, the regulation approach is often believed to be more efficient than 
state ownership and bureaucratic burden.  
In addition, not only have technological changes affected the definition of public goods, but the 
process of globalization has as well. Global public goods were defined in the framework of the 
United Nations Development Programme. In a globalizing world, there has emerged a necessity for 
new methods of dealing with topics such as international air traffic control, peace and security, the 
multilateral trade regime, water management, biodiversity conservation and corruption control– all 
of which are  perceived as global public goods.  
Six priority global public goods as identified by UN are: 
￿  Maintenance and enforcement of peace and security 
￿  Control of the spread of communicable diseases 
￿  Protection, preservation and exploitation of commons (biodiversity, natural resources) 
￿  Improvement of global financial stability 
￿  Open and fair international trading regime 
￿  International policy coordination and consensus on issues of private intellectual property and 
knowledge in the public domain 
A fundamental question raised in relation to global public goods is who should be entrusted with the 
decisions regarding multinational public goods specification and who should be charged with their 
maintenance. In addition, should a legal framework be included as one of the global public goods as 
defined by the UN? Is the definition of global public goods too broad?   
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